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COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM IN A 
NEW KEY 
Paul W. Kahn* 
Law is a symbolic system that structures the political imagination. 
The "rule of law" is a shorthand expression for a cultural practice that 
constructs a particular understanding of time and space, of subjects 
and groups, as well as of authority and legitimacy. It is a way of 
projecting, maintaining, and discovering meaning in the world of 
historical ,events and political possibilities.1 The rule of law - as opposed to the techniques of lawyering - is not the possession of 
lawyers. It is a characterization of the polity, which operates both 
descriptively and normatively in public perception. Ours, we believe, 
is a nation under law, and law is a normative measure of all that it 
might do. 
That the polity should express the rule of law is a belief that has 
been present from the revolutionary foundation of the nation. The end 
of the Revolution was to be the rule of law. Mexico may have sought 
to institutionalize revolution.2 In America, with abolition of the 
monarch, law was to be king.3 In our Founding myth, Revolution and 
Constitution are tightly bound together as equal and linked expres­
sions of popular sovereignty. The historical sources from which this 
understanding of law draws are not technical, but widely accessible. 
They are rooted in religious conceptions of ultimate meaning and 
Enlightenment understandings of rational perfectionism. The rule of 
law is our civic religion; it exists just at the intersection of faith and 
reason. 
If the rule of law is a cultural phenomenon, then there are no a 
priori grounds for believing that what is true in the United States - its 
practices and beliefs about law - is true elsewhere. The forms of law 
* Robert W. Winner Professor of Law and the Humanities and Director of the Orville 
H. Schell, Jr. Center for International Human Rights, Yale Law School. B.A. 1973, 
University of Chicago; Ph.D. (Philosophy) 1977, J.D. 1980, Yale. - Ed. Thanks for helpful 
comments to Alec Stone Sweet, Jed Rubenfeld, Mirjan Damaska, and Bruce Ackerman. 
1. See PAUL W. KAHN, THE CULTURAL STUDY OF LAW: RECONSTRUCTING LEGAL 
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2. The Institutional Revolutionary Party ("PRI") held the Mexican presidency from 
1929 to 2000. 
3. See Thomas Paine, Common Sense (1776), in POLITICAL WRITINGS 28 (B. Kuklich 
ed., 1989). 
2677 
2678 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 101 :2677 
may be as diverse as those of religion or art: the cultural practices of 
one community are just that - nothing upon which to build a univer­
sal claim. Of course, like other cultural practices, the rule of law does 
not come from nowhere. The American rule of law is embedded 
within broader Western traditions. It is one particular formation of 
the historically possible.4 Inherited practices and beliefs, however, 
never point in a single direction; they never have the coherence of a 
rationally ordered or a causally determined system. 
Despite a shared, deep history of religious practice and of science 
in the West, there is substantial evidence to suggest that the modern 
American culture of law's rule may be rather distinctive. Most evident 
to contemporary legal scholars is the deep resistance within the 
American practice of constitutional law to arguments that appeal to 
international or comparative law. Our practices in this respect are 
strikingly different from those of other constitutional democracies. 
While others are pursuing a transnational constitutional discourse, 
Americans are determined to locate their constitutional discourse 
within their own unique text and their own historical narrative. The 
American concern with "original intent," for example, appears simply 
irrational - a kind of legal fetish - to the rest of the world. Why 
should we care more about the intent of the Founders - who are 
long-dead as well as culturally removed from us - than about the 
understandings of contemporary judges struggling with the same 
problems of governance of a modern welfare state in countries with 
which we must build a just and efficient global order of law? There is 
no principled answer to this question, if we mean by that an answer 
accessible to those outside of our own culture. There is only a set of 
practices and beliefs by which we understand who we are. 
A cultural approach seems to begin by turning away from the rest 
of the world. Why, then, should it turn back to take up the subject of 
comparative constitutionalism? Not for the sake of reform. The 
pursuit of reform is the most prominent feature of the contemporary 
study of law. The scholar asks "what should the law be."5 But a culture 
is not trying to be anything other than what it is.6 Of course, it has its 
own internal norms; it will even have norms about norms. But from 
the perspective of cultural studies, those norms are phenomena to 
explain, not goals to advance. A cultural approach begins by bracket­
ing off the study of law from the practice of reforming the law. The 
same is true in its approach to comparative constitutionalism. The aim 
cannot be to determine the most efficient or efficacious constitutional 
4. Borrowing from Foucault, I have called this inherited conceptual horizon the 
"historical a priori." See KAHN, CULTURAL STUDY OF LAW, supra note 1, at 36. 
5. See ROBERTO M. UNGER, WHAT SHOULD LEGAL ANALYSIS BECOME? (1996). 
6. See KAHN, CULTURAL STUDY OF LAW, supra note 1, at 92-97. 
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practices, nor can it be to advance a conception of justice. Compara­
tive work may in fact be useful in the pursuit of reform, but the pursuit 
of reform undermines the objective of a cultural approach to law. To 
return to an example that I have used elsewhere: we don't study com­
parative religion in order to figure out which religion is the best or to 
reform our own set of beliefs.7 
The cultural approach nevertheless should be interested in com­
parative constitutionalism for the same reason that the study of our 
own religious practices and beliefs can be usefully illuminated by 
studying those of others. If the rule of law is a cultural practice - for 
us a wholly naturalized one - then the unnoticed in our practices may 
become visible in the contrast with other cultural practices of law. This 
is a particularly important inquiry at the present moment, for one 
aspect of globalization is an effort to move toward a common constitu­
tionalism. A cultural approach can illuminate the different constitu­
tionalisms that already exist. It can help us better to understand what 
is at stake in various efforts at reform and in the movement toward 
globalization. Most importantly, it can help us to understand who we 
are. It cannot, however, tell us whether we should remain what we 
have been. 
Constitutional-court judges around the world often seem to believe 
that they are engaged in a single, transnational conversation with their 
counterparts. They write opinions as much for each other - drawing 
freely on their collective work - as they do for their own citizenry. 
This is comparativism under the sign of reform. It is the dominant dis­
course of the contemporary practice of comparative constitutionalism 
and the main source of interest in the field. This entire approach is 
deeply against the grain of our own practice of constitutionalism. 
American constitutional discourse does not fall within this transna­
tional discourse - although to the degree that American law profes­
sors share the liberal aspiration for a global order of law, they are 
doing their best to push American entry into this discursive practice. 
A cultural approach can be a powerful antidote to this liberal ideal 
of world governance under the rule of law. Not, however, because it 
defends an alternative normative vision. It does not argue for diversity 
against uniformity. It does not argue for any position at all. Rather, its 
ambition is only to show that the field upon which the reformers act is 
more complex than they imagine; that the values at stake do not all 
respond to the demands of reason, nor line up in a particular direction. 
Whether they should or not is a different question. That question is no 
more accessible to the academic than the question of whether or not 
individuals should fall in love, should find particular works of art 
beautiful, or believe in certain gods. The rule of law is as fundamental 
7. KAHN, CULTURAL STUDY OF LAW, supra note 1, at 2. 
2680 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 101:2677 
to individual and group identity as these other cultural practices. Law 
professors can, of course, have a position on who we should be as indi­
viduals and citizens. But their claim to legal expertise does not give 
them a privileged position in that debate. Perhaps this is the most 
important lesson that a cultural approach has to offer: claims of exper­
tise in the law do not offer a short cut to political reform. If Americans 
should be other than they are, changing them will take a good deal 
more than appeals to law reform. 
I. PLACING THE CULTURAL: FROM THE UNIVERSAL TO THE 
PARTICULAR 
The cultural approach to comparative constitutionalism stands at 
just the opposite extreme from that of most social scientists who study 
law. Their approach is to come to the courts, including constitutional 
courts, from the perspective of the institutional deployment of politi­
cal power. Courts interact with other governmental institutions in the 
production of policy. Accordingly, they should be studied from the 
perspective of the policies they help to produce.8 That study has both 
an internal and an external component. 
Like any other actors in the process of policy formation, the courts 
want to be successful. This means, in part, taking those measures that 
will legitimate their own role. Judicial behavior is simultaneously 
directed at producing policy and securing an institutional role. For an 
institution without material resources, efficacy is tightly tied to legiti­
macy. From this perspective, we can understand the expansion and 
rationalization of jurisdiction, as well as the internal norms of consis­
tency, explanation, and selfcitation.9 Indeed, one of the lessons of 
Marbury10 is the way in which a court's claim to "look to" the 
Constitution is itself a means of building the authority of the court 
vis-a-vis other political actors and in the eyes of the public. We can 
think of these as the "internal" necessities of the judiciary. 
Apart from studying the courts' institutional self-interest, inquiry 
must also explore the opportunities courts present to "players" -
individuals and groups - to advance their own agendas, or to block 
the accomplishment of others' agendas. Interested individuals and 
groups will make use of whatever institutions are available in order to 
advance their interests.11 They will turn to the courts when there is 
8. See, e.g., MARTIN SHAPIRO & ALEC STONE SWEET, ON LAW, POLITICS, AND 
JUDICIALIZATION 3-13 (2002). 
9. See Alec Stone Sweet, Path Dependence, Precedent, and Judicial Power, in ON LAW, 
POLITICS, AND JUDICIALIZA TION, supra note 8, at 112, 112-35. 
10. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
11. See MARTIN SHAPIRO, LAW AND POLITICS IN THE SUPREME COURT: NEW 
APPROACHES TO POLITICAL JURISPRUDENCE (1964). 
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some advantage in doing so. Their interest is not in vindicating or 
affirming the rule of law, but in accomplishing ends exogenous to the 
judicial system. Courts can become effective policy players when they 
present a means of compensating for setbacks and defeats in the ordi­
nary policy-setting institutions of the state, whether legislative or 
regulative. 
Both approaches are interested in understanding how a constitu­
tional court contributes to th·e formation of an actual regulative policy, 
for example, labor law or telecommunications law. On the former 
approach, we would be interested in studying the growth of doctrine 
as one case is followed by another, and as different courts respond to 
the decisions of others. We would also track the way in which judicial 
decisions shape the perception of possibility within other institutions. 
On the latter, we would look to see how contending factions use the 
availability of the courts and constitutional arguments as a means to 
the formation of policies that they seek to advance. The social scientist 
believes that these two approaches are appropriately pursued with re­
spect to the study of any political institutions. For example, we would 
ask the same questions about the legislative role in the formation 
of policy, distinguishing between the necessities of the legislators -
getting reelected and expanding their influence - and those of the 
interest groups that seek to influence legislation. For the social scien­
tist, courts are to be integrated into a single study of politics. 
To the political scientist, there is nothing about the courts that 
cannot be captured in the ordinary forms of social science inquiry. 
Courts may believe that they are doing something different from 
legislatures - they may speak a language of law instead of economics, 
of rights instead of interests, and of constitutions instead of elections 
- but the social scientist reveals the courts to be nothing other than 
another site for the contestation and construction of policy. How 
courts do this matters far less than that they do it. Of course, social 
scientists are likely to disagree on the scope of the inquiry, the appro­
priate methodologies, and the range of factors that need to be consid­
ered. Alec Stone Sweet's approach, for example, is marked by the 
breadth of his methodological techniques and the range of interests he 
considers. He realizes that the juridification of policy takes place both 
on and off the bench, and that interests are not independent of institu­
tions and the rules those institutions deploy to resolve disputes.12 Still, 
the interesting comparative questions for social scientists are broadly 
political: How and where do constitutional courts create a substantial 
12. See, e.g., ALEC STONE SWEET, GOVERNING WITH JUDGES: CONSTITUTIONAL 
POLITICS IN EUROPE (2000); Alec Stone Sweet & Thomas C. Brunell, Constructing a 
Supranational Constitution: Dispute Resolution and Governance in the European Commu­
nity, 92 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 63 (1998). 
2682 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 101:2677 
policy-making role for themselves? How do they stand in relation to 
other institutions? Whose interests are advanced by that role? 
The legal scholar of comparative constitutionalism resists any sug­
gestion of a collapse of the distinction between law and politics. The 
distinctive character of law as a discipline is founded on just this claim 
of difference: law may be produced by politics, but it is not merely 
another forum for a politics driven by interests and power.13 Even as 
the legal scholar resists founding comparative work on broadly politi­
cal norms, he or she still needs a common measure by which to 
approach different constitutional systems. Indeed, the legal scholar's 
sense of the usefulness of the comparativist enterprise depends upon 
the possession of such a measure. Like virtually every other law 
scholar, the comparativist's common measure is the ambition to 
reform the rule of law under the guidance of reason. His or her aspira­
tion is to drive out of the constitutional-legal system those irrational 
aspects that can only be accounted for by the accidents of history 
or the misfortune of mistake. The end of legal study is to be a set of 
programmatic suggestions. 
Another name for those deficiencies identified by comparativist 
legal scholars is "politics." Here, they define themselves against the 
political-science approach. To the scholar of constitutional law, courts 
have a higher mission than offering an alternative forum for 
interest-group politics, on the one hand, or expanding their own influ­
ence, on the other. Courts are to represent principle, reason, rights, or 
enduring values. Different scholars will use different language. What 
they all have in common is the easy move from a particular to a trans­
national discourse: reason cannot mean one thing in one place and 
another elsewhere. Rights are universal. Who can object to such 
enduring values as liberty, equality, and due process? The legal 
scholar as comparative constitutionalist gladly takes up the role of 
norm articulation for the new transnational legal order. He or she 
personifies a liberal attitude toward law's rule, which expresses a 
genuine skepticism, if not hostility, toward the particularity of national 
politics. 
This contrast in approaches to comparative constitutionalism 
reflects a fundamental split within the Enlightenment tradition over 
the locus of a practical science of politics. Most social scientists locate 
the science of politics - reason - in their own enterprise of study. 
13. Periodically, legal movements arise that challenge this distinction: most famously, 
the legal realists; most recently, the Critical Legal Studies Movement. These dissident groups 
never last for long because their own investments in law - and the possibilities of law - are ' 
too great. The legal realists are literally brought back into the fold by appointment to the 
Bench and success in the Academy. The Crits find themselves committed to legal claims of, 
right and disempowered in the turn to politics. 
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The objects of that study - the political practices of a community -
respond to interests and power. For these scholars, it is a kind of 
Hegelian confusion to suggest that the domain of the political is the 
working out of reason itself. Reason is what the social scientist brings 
to the conflict of interests that is politics. Reforming the disorder of 
the political is possible at the margins, but it is fundamentally a mis­
take to think that politics is supposed to be the working out of reason's 
path. Politics, even in its juridical form, is only the means to the 
satisfaction of interests that are, for the most part, exogenous to 
the institutions available for their accomplishment. Comparative 
constitutionalism is thus a study of the ways of power. The reason to 
which it appeals is the reason of categorization, generalization, and 
prediction. These are in the possession of the scholar, and they are of 
little or no interest to the actual actors.14 Whatever regularities appear 
in the phenomena are produced by common interests, which may be 
more or less extensive. 
The comparative-constitutional-law scholars don't accept the 
premise that reason is and must remain outside of politics.15 For them, 
the role of the constitution is to subject politics to higher norms of 
reason. A constitution expresses the reasonable ordering of the polity; 
it is reason's presence within the internal workings of the state itself. 
This is not a matter of describing a particular constitutional text or of 
analyzing the origins of that text - which may indeed point to a 
contribution from the understandings of the political scientist. It is, 
rather, the animating idea behind modern constitutionalism and con­
stitutional decisions: reason itself constitutes the implicit constitution 
toward which every decision is reaching. Legal scholars believe that if 
we cannot separate law from politics, we are already examining a 
failure of the rule of law. Who in the constitutional state is willing to 
say that the constitution requires "irrationality" of us or that it 
demands the violation of fundamental rights or compelling moral 
principles? Of course, powerful interest groups may manage to 
entrench in the constitution their own interests, but that represents a 
deficiency under the rule of law; it is an appropriate object for future 
reform.16 
14. When the scholar believes his knowledge qualifies him for a political role, he 
commits himself to a kind of vanguardism, which does not have a particularly good track 
record, beginning with Plato's mission to Syracuse. 
15.  Because Stone Sweet places the self-elaboration of judicial rationales at the center 
of his account of the political development and effectiveness of constitutional courts, his 
work straddles this divide and may even be closer to that of the legal scholars. 
16. In American constitutional history, the best example is the constitutional protection 
of slavery until passage of the Civil War Amendments. 
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From the perspective of the constitutional-law scholar, then, the 
ideal of reason works within the object of the scholar's study. '7 Reason 
is already there, and the scholar's contribution is only to make clear 
what it is that reason demands. The ambition of his study is not to 
understand the law by deploying tools of inquiry that are not them­
selves a part of the object of study, but rather to say "what the law 
should be." Because the constitution lays claim to reason within the 
state, the distinction between what the law i·s and what it should be is 
so narrow as to disappear in the scholar's self-understanding. The rule 
of law is and should be the rule of reason. Reform, accordingly, is not 
a process brought to law from the outside, but the internal develop­
ment of the law itself.18 
It would be too much to say of comparative constitutionalists that 
their ambition is to find the hidden science of constitutionalism that 
should unite all liberal constitutions as variations on a common theme 
- but it would not be exaggerating all that much. Indeed, if one turns 
from American to European and Latin American constitutionalists, 
the ambition to locate comparative studies in the science of law is not 
hidden at all. 
If we ask what is the organizational structure of this belief in an 
objective, universal constitutionalism of reason, we find a doctrine of 
rights and a theory of political legitimacy. The former locates com­
parative constitutionalism in the discourse of human rights; the latter, 
in the modern social-contract tradition. Contemporary constitutional­
ism is the inheritor of a double-stream of thought. The science of poli­
tics of the eighteenth century was a mechanistic science of institutions. 
These institutions were to mediate between the social-contractarian 
origins of the legitimate state and the exercise of authority by agents 
of the state. The aim was to structure institutions such that they would 
serve to restrain the potential abuse of the political power created by 
the social contract itself.19 The science of politics of the twentieth 
century, on the other hand, is one of universal human rights. The 
protection from the abuse of power appears now as less a function of 
institutional design than of delineation of a set of legal claims that pro-
tect the individual as a rights-bearing subject.20 
• 
17. British common law was, for a long time, able to offer a foundation for reason within 
the state. The move toward written constitutionalism in contemporary Britain suggests a 
deeper conflict over the locus of reason - i.e., a debate over the roles of history and 
contemporary expertise in the identification of reason. This is a debate that never goes away, 
but reappears in questions concerning the role of precedent in interpreting a constitutional 
text: Why should past understandings ever be favored over contemporary reasoning? 
18. See KAHN, CULTURAL STUDY OF LAW, supra note 1, at 7-18. 
19. On this, The Federalist Papers remains the classic text, with its emphasis on 
federalism and separation of powers. 
20. One characteristic of contemporary, American constitutional theory is the effort to 
link these two sources. We see, for instance, arguments that federalism or the separation of 
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Legal scholars understand constitutional courts to be working on a 
common set of problems dealing primarily with rights and legitimacy. 
The scholar looks to the variety of national, constitutional courts to 
learn from the experience and arguments of others. Every modern, 
liberal state confronts the same set of constitutional issues - rights to 
privacy, speech, process, and welfare, on the one hand, and issues of 
legitimate institutional design, on the other. Since courts address these 
issues in an order that is entirely accidental, one constitutional court 
can make use of the research and reasoning of another court that may 
have confronted a similar problem earlier. Comparative materials, 
thus, come to compete with precedents as a material source of legal 
reasoning. If the authority of the decision rests upon its appeal to 
reason, then this approach appears not only natural, but essential. It 
draws upon the model of inquiry of other sciences. No research pro­
gram can fetishize its own past; rather, it must remain open to new 
"discoveries" wherever they are made. 
Both of these approaches - that of the social scientist and of the 
legal scholar - miss much that is essential to understanding the 
character of the American rule of law. More importantly, they fail to 
understand the way in which the Supreme Court is embedded 
functionally and institutionally in beliefs about the rule of law. The 
Court's most important role is not to make policy, nor to achieve the 
ends of a rational legal science - although surely the Court does 
make policy and is subject to the critique of reason. Rather, the pri­
mary work of the Supreme Court is to construct and maintain an 
understanding of our polity as the expression of the rule of law. This 
function operates, for the most part, independently of the outcomes 
the Court reaches, even in controversial cases. For example, were the 
Court to reverse Roe v. Wade,21 it would do so in the name of the rule 
of law. The opinion would celebrate the "recovery" of law in just the 
same way that Adarand celebrates the rule of law while reversing 
Metro Broadcasting.22 This does not mean that the Court can say 
whatever it wants. But with respect to any controversial case that 
makes it to the Court, there are sufficient legal materials available to 
support either affirmance or reversal. Dissents could be majority 
opinions. We cannot tell them apart solely by reference to the 
standards of legal reasoning and the rule of law. 
powers actually have their purposes in the protection of individual rights. See, e.g. , United 
States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 575-79 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring). Contrast this with an 
earlier understanding of separation of powers as a negative doctrine of protecting rights 
by disabling government. See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 
613-14 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
21. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
22 See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995); Metro 
Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990). 
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This role of the Court does not depend on getting the outcomes 
right, nor does it depend on supporting the interests of some groups 
and not others. Rather, the Court works to support and maintain a 
cultural formation. As such, it can only be understood if we approach · 
the rule of law as we would any other set of cultural beliefs: religious, 
mythic, aesthetic, or even scientific. We cannot ask about the truth of 
the law, nor about its usefulness, if our ambition is to understand it as 
a world-view. Instead of the tools of science or of the self-elaboration 
of reason, we have to bring to the study of law the tools of cultural 
interpretation. 
Only when we understand our own Supreme Court as engaged in 
the unique enterprise of maintaining the belief in American 
citizenship as participation in a popular sovereign that expresses itself 
in and through the rule of law can we begin to understand the 
immense power of this institution. That power has its symbolic point 
of origin in Marbury v. Madis,on,23 but its most vivid recent display in 
Bush v. Gore.24 Marbury articulates a vision of the rule of law even as 
the Court shows itself to be a weak political actor. Two hundred years 
later, that same vision operates as the civic religion of the American 
nation-state.25 
The Court as the guardian of that symbolic order wields an 
unquestionable power. So much so that it can tell us that the President 
of the United States is the person who lost the popular vote. 
Americans have no theory of legitimate government other than that of 
democratic decisionmaking, limited by a regime of individual rights -
if we mean by theory, an appeal to principles and rational arguments 
based upon those principles. They literally had no theory by which 
they could understand how Bush could be a legitimate President. 
Had the same thing happened elsewhere, they would have taken it 
as evidence of an antidemocratic frustration of the legitimate will of 
the people. Nevertheless, Americans have a profound faith in the 
Constitution and in the Court as the voice of the Sovereign People. 
When faced with a choice between a theory of legitimacy and an 
affirmation of their symbolic order, there was no contest. Not even the 
losing party could seriously complain about the outcome. They too 
had to affirm that ours is a nation under law and the Court's decision 
is the final word on what the Constitution means. 
Americans are willing parishioners in this Temple of Belief. When 
the Court spoke, the election was over. This was so even though few 
outside of the professorate claimed to understand the words spoken, 
and even though most scholars thought it an unconvincing opinion. 
23. 5 U.S. ( 1 Cranch)137 (1803). 
24. 531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
25. For a detailed exploration of that vision, see KAHN, REIGN OF LAW, supra note 1 .  
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There was no further appeal to the court of political opinion. If we 
approach the subject of comparative constitutionalism with this expe­
rience in mind, we open up a new range of questions: we ask whether 
constitutional courts elsewhere are similarly engaged in a mythic 
enterprise of maintaining a community of faith. If they are, we need to 
investigate what are the elements of that faith and in what ways they 
resemble our own faith in the rule of law. 
Take as a simple example the American practice of judicial 
appointment - particularly of a Supreme Court Justice. A nominee is 
ordinarily selected on the basis of beliefs about how he or she is likely 
to vote. Selection is a highly political process in which interests are 
assessed and interest groups are heard. The reaction to the nominee 
- both for and against - is based on a similar assessment of interests. 
Yet, we invest a tremendous amount of effort and resources into 
denying the political character of the process. The President will 
announce that he picked the best jurist and desires only a Justice who 
will follow the rule of law.26 The nominee will steadfastly refuse to 
comment on how she might vote on any issue that might come before 
the Court. We hear instead statements of allegiance to the law, of 
good faith in studying briefs and arguments. As a Justice, the nominee 
assures us, she will be wholly transparent to, and an instrument of, the 
law. Whatever she may have felt and believed beforehand, life will 
begin again with the donning of the uniform black robe of the Bench. 
Confirmation is literally a ritual of transformation - a rite of 
passage - whereby an individual who had been a political being 
becomes an instrumentality of the rule of law. Nothing is allowed to 
survive that breaks from one world into the other. The appointee will 
be born again, stripped of her old party attachments, institutional 
affiliations, contacts, and even friendships. Elected officials bring their 
political advisors with them; a Justice is not even supposed to accept a 
phone call from the very people who helped her obtain office. Once 
she enters the Temple of Justice, she is literally on her own - with the 
exception of a few law clerks, who are themselves characterized by 
their political innocence - standing before that mysterium tremen­
dum of our civic order: the Constitution. 
Every country confronts the problem of the relationship between 
its courts and its political institutions, i.e., between law and politics. 
The legitimacy of the courts depends to a substantial degree on the 
judges' independence from those who exercise political power. Given 
the power of constitutional courts, the problem is even more acute 
with respect to them. But in some countries the approach to the prob­
lem is not to suppress but to make explicit the relationship between 
26. See, for example, the statement of President Bush on the nomination of Clarence 
Thomas to the Supreme Court. Nomination of Judge Thomas by President Bush, available at 
http://www.people.virginia.edu/-govdoc/thomas/nomination.html (last visited Nov. 8, 2003). 
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political belief and judicial appointment. In France, "the single most 
important criterion for appointment to the [Constitutional] Council is 
political affiliation, and the Council has been dominated by profes­
sional politicians. "27 Something similar is true of the constitution of the 
International Court of Justice, which not only follows a principle of 
geographic distribution, but also guarantees the right of any state 
brought before the Court to have a justice sitting on the bench for that 
case.28 
Of course, this does not mean that the appointee simply acts as a 
representative, tending to the interests of his political party or state. 
The explicit connection to politics in the appointments process may 
have to be overcome at another point in the judicial process. Yet, in 
the United States, we cannot even get close to such an acknowledg­
ment of the intersection of law and politics. In our cultural construc­
tion, they are maintained on separate sides of an unbridgeable divide 
such that the private person the Justice had been wholly disappears. 
once she receives the commission. She has no more connection to that 
former life than does the priest who takes confession and administers 
the sacrament. 
This idea is interestingly refracted through the inquiry of the first 
part of Marbury, in which the question is whether Marbury has a right 
to his commission.29 The Court can only answer that question by 
answering the question of whether he is a Justice of the Peace: Has he 
completed the transition from political actor - Marbury was a 
Federalist party operative in Maryland - to an instrumentality of the 
law? In concluding that his right has vested and that what has been 
done by law cannot be undone by politics, the members of the Court 
are speaking no less of their own appointments. They may have been 
the political associates of the now-defeated Adams, but now they exist 
only in the dimension of law. Indeed, they have lost their personal 
voice, as well as their political appearance. Marbury is not the voice of 
John Marshall, former Federalist Secretary of State; it is the "opinion 
of the Court," which may be announced by Marshall but purports to 
be the opinion of us all as participants in the popular sovereign.30 The 
Justices tell us that they exist completely in and of the law, beyond the 
space of politics. That, at least, is what they would have us believe, and 
for the most part we do. 
For us, recognition of the connection of law to politics appears 
only as a form of critique. Indeed, this is the most standard and the 
27. ALEC STONE, THE BIRTH OF JUDICIAL POLITICS IN FRANCE: THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL COUNCIL IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 50 (1992). 
28. Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 31, available at http://www.icj­
cij.org/icjwww/ibasicdocuments/ibasictext/ibasicstatute.htm (last visited Nov. 8, 2003). 
29. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 154 (1803). 
30. See KAHN, REIGN OF LAW, supra note 1, at 209-19. 
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most devastating critique that can be offered of a judge: his or her 
decisions are based on politics, not on law. But while the most devas­
tating of critiques, it is also completely ineffective against the autono­
mous character of law's rule. For if we go one step further, we see that 
the legal order is not just generally selfprotective as a matter of institu­
tional interest, but has at its heart an internal mechanism of neutral­
izing this critique. Even decisions most criticized as the products of 
politics become precedents to be acknowledged and followed in future 
cases. What had been politics is transformed into law such that a 
failure to follow it becomes itself a sign of misplaced politics.31 This 
produces the peculiar cycle of expert reaction to the decisions of the 
Court. First, the decisions are criticized as failing to follow existing 
law. If so, they must be based on something outside of law - i.e., the 
political beliefs of the Justices. Second, those· same decisions must be 
integrated into a comprehensive account of what the law is, which is 
just what the expert claims to possess. The decision thereby moves 
from object of criticism to a naturalized place within the body of law. 
The Court, thereby, produces its own infallibility as long as belief in 
the rule of law is sustained. The most poignant display of this 
movement in recent years was in Casey, where Justices appointed 
politically with an eye to overruling Roe found themselves bound by 
the internal mechanisms of legal reasoning to affirm the precedent.32 
The same movement from aberration to norm characterizes the recent 
federalism jurisprudence of the Court. 
The separation of law and politics is secured in some countries by 
an institutionalization of the idea of legal expertise. This institutionali­
zation can take a variety of forms. Some countries train their judges 
separately from their practicing bar, and offer them a career path 
wholly within the judiciary. Expertise in judging is seen as a skill to be 
developed over an entire career.33 Others establish a committee of 
experts to create short lists of those "most qualified" for judicial 
appointment. Those lists tend to focus on the most successful practi­
tioners before the courts. France follows the former route; England, 
the latter.34 Other countries rely heavily upon law professors. In Israel, 
appointments to the Bench are a product of a "Nominations Commit-
31. This is why the persistence of dissent is such a problem for the rule of law. A Court 
that remains divided on the same issues is always one that suggests the connection of law to 
politics. On the other hand, the American practice of dissent may itself be made possible by 
the strong investment in other means of separating law from politics. 
32. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854-64 (1992). 
33. See John Bell, Principles as Methods of Judicial Selection in France, 61 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 1757, 1758 (1988). 
34. In France, of course, the Constitutional Council is not part of the regular judiciary 
and its appointments follow a different - and more political - process. 
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tee" that institutionalizes ideals of professional expertise.35 We follow 
none of these procedures.36 Constitutional law cannot appear a myste­
rious science in this country. It cannot be the possession of experts or 
careerists. 
Just as with the relationship of law to politics, the construction of 
constitutional interpretation requires a willing suspension of disbelief. 
We may know that the law is an enterprise of erudite and sophisti­
cated interpretation, but it nevertheless cannot appear inaccessible to 
the least of us - at least constitutional law cannot appear that way, 
whatever may be true of the more technical areas of regulation.37 The 
criminal defendant, in this respect, stands for anyone and everyone in 
his relationship to the exercise of the state's legal authority: he is read 
his rights and asked if he understands what has been read to him. 
Many states around the world today have lengthy constitutions 
that establish law in great detail. Our Constitution remains a short, 
eighteenth-century document written, for the most part, in the 
vernacular. Its most important phrases are simple and direct: "free 
exercise," "freedom of speech," "commander in chief," or "legislative 
power." Of course, the whole document has been subject to hundreds 
of years of esoteric interpretation, but that is another matter. Here, 
what matters is the belief in the citizen's direct accessibility to the text. 
At stake in that relationship of accessibility is the foundational claim 
of the American rule of law: the Constitution expresses the voice of 
the popular sovereign. It is the possession of the people, not of the 
legal scientist. 38 
The citizen stands to the rule of law as both subject and author. In 
his particularity, he is ruled by the law, but as a part of the popular 
sovereign, he is the author of that law. This relationship of part to 
whole, which Rousseau theorized, rests at the foundation of American 
belief in the rule of law. This belief is maintained not as a matter of 
democratic theory, but as a cultural practice of ritual, myth, and faith. 
At the center of this practice, we find the Justices of the Supreme 
Court. 
Our Justices don't just represent the nation as a single community 
under law. Their role is performative, not representative. The Court is 
the locus of our belief in ourselves as a Sovereign People. Listening to 
35. See SHIMON SHETREET, JUSTICE IN ISRAEL: A STUDY OF THE ISRAELI JUDICIARY 
(1994). 
36. The Bush administration recently broke with past practice of obtaining a formal 
evaluation of judicial nominees from the American Bar Association. 
37. Special technical courts are not just a matter of localizing expertise, but also of pre­
serving the general symbolic character of the other courts. 
38. See JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN, THE INTELLIGIBLE CONSTITUTION: THE SUPREME 
COURT'S OBLIGATION TO MAINTAIN THE CONSTITUTION AS SOMETHING WE THE PEOPLE 
CAN UNDERSTAND (1992). 
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the Court, we are to hear ourselves. This is the meaning and legacy of 
Marbury. The Court speaks in the voice of the popular sovereign only 
as long as and to the degree that people believe it does. The legitimacy 
of the judicial voice depends upon the Court's ability to maintain this 
belief. The Justices must, accordingly, maintain a sense of contact with 
the people: they are everyman, not an elite distinguished by an 
esoteric training and knowledge.39 Of course, this does not mean that 
we think they can be ignorant of the law. But there is a continuity 
from jury, to judge, to Justice. All present us to ourselves as a self­
governing community. 
In the vernacular of ordinary belief, we find two connected mythi­
cal assertions: "anyone can grow up to be President" and any individ­
ual has a right to take his grievances "all the way to the Supreme 
Court." This sense of selfgovernment through law is threatened by too 
explicit an acknowledgment of a legal science. Indeed, claims to legal 
science in this country were thoroughly discredited in the early part of 
the twentieth century when the Court allowed a wide gap to errterge 
between its voice and that of the popular opinion.40 The Court, as 
Alexander Bickel said, "labors under an obligation to succeed," by 
which he meant that their opinions must not only be principled but 
must be accepted as such by the nation.41 
To understand what is going on here we have to think of the rites 
of passage that transform the ordinary individual into a priest. In an 
age that no longer believes in the ancient God of the Church, we could 
say that there can be no real transformation of the person. The priest, 
we are all too aware, remains the same person, with the same interests, 
desires, and even passions. We could say this because we know it to be 
true. But we do not say it because we willingly suspend disbelief. We 
understand that a symbolic universe of meaning is not merely a 
personal universe of interest. Power exists not as an individual capac­
ity to take advantage of social position. Rather, power exists in a role 
that is made possible by a culture of belief that is shared by the self 
and others.42 Neither priest nor judge mediates between the individual 
and a transcendent subject. Both mediate between the individual and 
a symbolic order that is as real, but no more real, than language or 
history. That, however, is not only real enough; it is the only reality we 
ever had. 
39. See Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court 1985 Term - Foreword: Traces of Self 
Government, 100 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1986). 
40. See PAUL W. KAHN, LEGITIMACY AND HISTORY: SELF-GOVERNMENT IN 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 125-31 (1992) [hereinafter KAHN, LEGITIMACY 
AND HISTORY). 
41.  ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME 
COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 239 (2d ed. 1986). 
42. Of course, power that exists can be abused for personal ends. 
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The American rule of law is neither politics nor science. To recog­
nize this is the first step in understanding law as its own symbolic 
system. Like all such systems, it offers a complete ordering of the 
world. From within law, we can look out on science and politics - law 
offers an understanding of both. But it does so without collapsing into 
either. Comparative constitutionalism, from the perspective of a 
cultural approach, must not collapse the inquiry into the rule of law 
into either science or politics. Everything is at stake, therefore, in the · 
opening assumptions of the inquiry. If we want to understand the 
meaning of judicial review, we can't just look at doctrines of rights that 
are produced by the courts, nor at the political maneuvering that tries 
to affect the outcomes. We have to look instead at the rituals and 
myths of law - the content of the faith in law's rule. 
II. SOME INITIAL DIVISIONS 
Every modern, Western state characterizes itself as both demo­
cratic and law-governed. No state can ignore or give up these terms 
because they bear directly on the legitimacy of the polity and its 
government. Both terms refer less to a defined set of practices than to 
a popular selfconception: the state must hold itself out to its citizens as 
both democratic and law-governed. Nevertheless, neither the meaning 
of these terms, nor their relationship to each other, is self-evident. 
Indeed, both are ways of understanding or characterizing the entire · 
state from a particular point of view. A democratic state may include 
undemocratic institutions, and it may set restrictions on the reach of 
democratic decisionmaking, but both kinds of limits must themselves 
be grounded in an understanding of the conditions of democratic 
legitimacy. Democratic states don't yield any area as beyond the 
concern of a democratic populace, even if the conclusion is to exclude 
the area from the immediate reach of democratic politics. 
The same is true of the rule of law. A state under law does not 
leave room for a discretionary power outside of, or unbounded by, the 
rule of law. Rather, discretion is a function of law. For example, the 
President has substantial discretion with respect to foreign policy 
because he has been assigned that role by the Constitution. Nor does , 
the rule of law respect the division between the private and the public. 
The law may have little to say about the private affairs of the family, 
but all that means is that those affairs are permitted under the law. We 
see this immediately if there is pathological deviance from the norm. , 
The modern welfare state is capable of massive intervention in the . 
family when necessary. The family too is a space regulated by law.43 
43. See Jill Elaine Hasday, Parenthood Divided: A Legal History of the Bifurcated Law 
of Parental Relations, 90 GEO. L.J. 299 (2002). 
August 2003] Comparative Constitutionalism in a New Key 2693 
From within the rule of law, anything that is outside is "illegal." 
About every action and proposed action within the state, we can ask 
the question "is it legal?" There is always an affirmative or a negative 
answer to this.44 Similarly, about every object and space, we can ask 
"who is its owner" and about every subject we can ask "is he a 
citizen?" A state that allowed law to govern only a part of its activities 
would appear to lack the rule of law. If there is no outside, then it is 
wrong to think of law as distinguished by certain marks or characteris­
tics - the approach of analytic jurisprudence. The rule of law is a 
symbolic order that is constitutive of an entire world view. It is as 
comprehensive as science, religion, or economics. There is no 
phenomenon that is beyond scientific explanation, beyond God's 
order, or beyond a measure of value. Neither is there anything beyond 
law. To explore the culture of law's rule is to describe the manner in 
which a world of legal meaning is created and maintained. 
Creation does not begin with a constitution. The relationship be­
tween constitution and the rule of law is not a relationship of causality, 
as if the entire order of law flows from the constitution. It is rather the 
other way around. Because we find ourselves believing in the rule of 
law, we make possible a constitution. States that do not believe in the 
rule of law may formally have constitutions, but those constitutions do 
not serve the legal function expected in the West. Accordingly, before 
we get to a text, we need to ask about the possibilities that a text can 
serve. Those possibilities are established by the structure of belief that 
attaches to the very idea of the rule of law within a community. 
Scholars of comparative constitutionalism, as well as ordinary 
observers, are likely to make an initial division between states with or 
without a written constitution. They will make a further division based 
on systems of representation - parliamentary or presidential, feder­
alist or centralist. Finally, they are likely to differentiate constitutional 
forms based on the presence and character of judicial review: abstract 
or concrete, specialized constitutional court or regular courts. Having 
delineated broad structural categories, they will turn to a comparison 
of constitutional rights: social and economic, or political and civil. I 
want to suggest a different division - that between constitutional 
regimes that purport to be founded on the sovereign will and those 
that rest on a claim to reason. Only when we turn to this distinction 
can we begin to answer the question "what is the structure of belief 
that characterizes a court engaged in judicial review?" 
In the West, we are never far from these double sources of 
authority: reason and will. Law as the will of the sovereign is our 
oldest idea of the origin of law; law as the expression of reason is our 
oldest source of the critique of laws. Even a creator God is subject to 
44. That the international order did not share this quality was one reason for the tradi­
tional skepticism regarding the claim that international Jaw was Jaw. 
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the critique of reason - that is the puzzle for which the history of 
theodicies in the West was to be the answer.45 God's will may be the 
source of law, but God's will cannot be irrational. If that will appears 
arbitrary and capricious, there must be a problem in man's apprehen­
sion of the divine plan. The distinction is captured in the traditional 
European monarchy. Drawing on ideas of divine will and presence, 
the monarch as sovereign is the mystical corpus of the state.46 Law 
expresses the will of this sovereign, which is not the same as the finite 
will of the individual who happens to be king. The transformation of 
the individual into the sovereign is a ritual process quite independent 
of his or her quality of judgment or capacity for rule. This dimension 
of succeeding to the throne is a matter of legitimacy - a usurper 
might be labeled "illegitimate." The legitimacy of power, however, is 
not an answer to the problem of just rule. Even legitimate power can 
be abused. The answer to that problem is rule according to reason. 
Exactly the same reasoning is present in a democratic state. A gov­
ernment may come to power through an electoral victory. Electoral 
legitimacy, however, is not the only normative criterion we apply in 
evaluating a government and its law. Few people outside of Serbia 
were happy when Milosevic was elected. Indeed, even within Serbia, 
the Kosovars and others had much to fear from the election. A gov­
ernment may abuse its legitimate power by directing it to the accom­
plishment of factional interests instead of the public good. Rousseau 
warns that even if the faction expresses the will of all, it may still be 
subject to the critique of reason for failing to advance the public 
good.47 Plato made the same point at the origin of Western philosophy: 
pursuit of interest without knowledge of the good is just as likely to 
lead to political and moral failure as to success.48 A democracy can 
destroy itself no less than an autocracy. 
In the liberal tradition, the only measure of the public good is the 
discourse of reason. Of course, even among liberals there is no single 
direction marked as "the discourse of reason." The appeal to reason 
does not in itself tell us whether we should be Rawlsian contractarians 
or utilitarians - or how broadly to extend our recognition of utility. It 
does tell us, however, that an argument that simply makes a claim for 
factional advantage or personal interest does not in itself qualify as a 
public reason for common action. 
45. See SUSAN NEIMAN, EVIL IN MODERN THOUGHT: AN ALTERNATIVE HISTORY OF 
PHILOSOPHY (2002). 
46. See ERNST H. KANTOROWICZ, THE KING'S Two BODIES: A STUDY IN MEDIAEVAL 
POLITICAL THEOLOGY (1957). 
47. See JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 72-74 (Maurice Cranston 
ed., Penguin 1968) (1762). 
48. See PLATO, GORGIAS 466b-468e (G.P. Goold ed., 1961). 
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Every modem society is likely to sustain a serious debate over the 
character of justice and the public good. That debate is necessarily 
attached to law, not just because law is coercive and coercion must be 
justified in a liberal society, but also because law offers an image of 
ourselves and our public values. The liberal approach to constitution­
alism and to constitutional courts is to think of judicial review as the 
locus of an authoritative discourse of public reason. This is a position 
that easily accommodates, for example, Habermas's discourse ethics 
or Luhmann's idea of the autopoesis of law.49 We see this move toward 
the discourse of reason in the U.S. Supreme Court, when the Court 
invokes the need for "sound judgment" to determine those fundamen­
tal rights "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty."50 
Liberal constitutionalism tends to stop at just this point, seeing a 
choice between faction and the public good. This choice is negotiated 
successfully to the degree that law becomes the internalized expres­
sion of reason in the public order. But there is an equal and opposite 
reaction to the perception of the risk of faction or personal interest 
arising within the institutionalized mechanisms of governance. If we 
describe the tum to reason as the appeal to justice in order to deter­
mine the public good, we can describe the tum to the sovereign will as 
the tum to legitimacy. Precisely because justice is a contested concept, 
the appeal to justice alone can never suppress the alternative norm of 
legitimacy - and vice versa. 
This conception of legitimacy is not exhausted in the mechanisms 
of electoral politics. Constitutional politics is not ordinary electoral 
politics. Rather, constitutional politics invokes an identification with 
the transhistorical, popular sovereign. A king who was not perceived 
as the mystical corpus of the state failed in this dimension of legiti­
macy even if he rightfully succeeded to the throne. An elected leader 
who is viewed as representative of party interests rather than the 
entirety of the nation equally fails in the dimension of constitutional 
politics. Leaders must speak in the voice of the popular sovereign if 
citizens are to see themselves as participants in a political project that 
makes a compelling claim on individual identity. That project estab­
lishes the link a citizen feels between the self and the community's 
narrative, which, in tum, sets forth a privileged history and a national 
destiny. Citizens stand not just in a relationship of reason to each 
other and to the state, but in a relationship of identity. They 
understand themselves as mutual participants in a unique historical 
49. See generally HABERMAS ON LAW AND DEMOCRACY: CRITICAL EXCHANGES 
(Michel Rosenfeld & Andrew Arato eds., 1998); Niklas Luhmann, The Unity of the Legal 
System, in AUTOPOIETIC LAW: A NEW APPROACH TO LAW AND SOCIETY (Gunther 
Teubner ed., 1987). 
50. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 951 (1992); Palko v. Connecticut, 
302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937). 
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project and they are willing to sacrifice to assure the success of that 
project. 
This is the dimension of political leadership that Weber identifies 
with charisma.51 That, however, is to personalize it too much. Most 
importantly, it misses the direction in which we must look for expres­
sions of the popular sovereign. It is likely to point us toward electoral 
politics instead of law. In the United States, the most important source . 
of the expression of the transtemporal will of the popular sovereign is 
to be found in the Supreme Court. The Justices are hardly charismatic 
political leaders, yet the discourse of the Court is largely shaped by the 
political rhetoric of legitimacy. This is the animating source of the turn 
in American constitutional discourse toward the Framers, original 
intent, and the historical artifact of the text. It is the source of judicial 
resistance to the discourse of natural law, legal science, and claims of 
universal rights. 
Marbury was critical in the development of this tradition of judicial 
self-understanding. Marshall identifies the voice of the Court with the 
voice of the popular sovereign. If the Constitution is the expression of 
the popular sovereign and the role of the Court is to "say what the law 
is," then the opinion of the Court is the opinion of the people. Just 
here, we find the elaboration of the sovereign will. This equation 
equally implies that the President and Congress represent only popu­
lar opinion, which is always bound to contemporary circumstances. 
Popular opinion is changeable, while the opinion of the people is 
permanent. It is also the permanent possession of the Court. The 
success of Marbury is located in the strength of the belief that popular 
sovereignty and the rule of law are one and the same - the constitu­
tional rule of law is the expression of government by and through 
the popular sovereign. The cultural construction of the Court is the 
elaboration of this fundamental claim that here we find the sacred 
source of the nation itself. 
Just as the ideal of a discourse of reason does not specify the 
content of reason, the ideal of a discourse of sovereignty does not 
specify the character of the national will. We find two primary divi­
sions in modern politics. One identifies a prepolitical nation as the 
subject of the will; the other identifies the nation with the community 
of citizens, committed to each other through the institutions and laws 
of the state itself. This debate between ethnic nationalism and civic 
nationalism has been a contest over the very soul of the modern 
nation-state.52 In the post-Cold War era, the dispute has literally 
erupted into battle, as movements of ethnic nationalism have resisted 
51. See MAX WEBER, THE THEORY OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 
358-73 (AM. Henderson & Talcott Parsons trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1947). 
52. See, e.g. , MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, BLOOD AND BELONGING: JOURNEYS INTO THE 
NEW NATIONALISM 243 (1993). 
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norms of civic nationalism that were shared by both of the multi­
ethnic empires of the Cold War. Yugoslavia fails as a state when its 
diverse citizens no longer see themselves as participants in a common 
historical project of state construction and maintenance, which defines 
who they are. The Yugoslavian experience is so symbolically threat­
ening to Europe because of the latent character of a tradition of ethnic 
nationalism that cuts deeply against the project of civic nationalism 
represented not just by the European Union but by the emerging 
recognition of the multicultural character of individual European 
states. The same battle is going on in Israel as it struggles with its dual 
sources of legitimacy: it is to be both a Jewish state and a liberal, 
democratic state. 
This distinction of reason and will marks a fundamental difference 
in answering the question of what a constitution does. On one view, 
the constitution is the expression of reason within what would 
otherwise be a continuous conflict of interests among the individuals, 
parties, and institutions that constitute the state. The problem it 
addresses is not the construction of a nation, but the just organization 
of interests and interest groups. Its aim is not to make one out of 
many, but rather to impose order on disorder. The foundational act is 
not the analogue of God's speaking the world into existence, but 
rather a kind of Rawlsian inquiry into the reasonable structure of a 
common political project. 
The distinctive character of the Western study of law is the belief 
in the law's internalization of a principle of reason. This first view of 
constitutionalism identifies that principle of reason with the constitu­
tion - whether written or not. Indeed, the absence of a constitutional 
text is not an issue of tremendous import from this perspective. To say 
that something is unconstitutional is to say that it is unreasonable. The 
role of a constitutional court is to maintain the reasonableness of the 
polity by subordinating politics - always the expression of interests -
to law. 
Political identity is not at issue on this view of constitutionalism 
and the judicial role.53 We ask, for instance, what are the necessary 
conditions of a just political order; we produce, in response, a doctrine 
of rights. We similarly ask, what is the best method of organizing 
political activity, and respond with doctrines of separation of powers, 
of parliamentary government, or judicial review. On this view, consti­
tutions are experimental, not existential. They are subject to external 
norms - whether of justice or efficiency - rather than constitutive of 
the meaning of the political. We catch a remnant of this idea within 
53. This requires some qualification, since the commitment to a liberalism of reason can 
also be a commitment to be a certain kind of citizen, i.e., a liberal citizen. See infra text ac­
companying note 72. This commitment is likely to be qualified with the understanding that 
what is at stake is only political, not comprehensive, liberalism. 
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American constitutional law in the continuing attachment to the 
standard of minimum rationality. At no point can the Court say that 
the legal order is indifferent to its own reasonableness. However, what 
is a weak and politically ineffective standard here can be the primary 
source of constitutional review elsewhere. 
For example, judicial review in the Israeli Supreme Court is an 
endless deployment of proportionality review.54 Proportionality is 
nothing more than the contemporary expression of reasonableness. 
This is what the Israeli Court promises: It will guarantee that the , 
actions taken by the state pass a test of reasonableness. Reasonable­
ness requires first a specification of the right at issue - itself a product 
of a liberal science of law - and second the balancing against that 
right of the government's interest in the purported action. The Israeli 
Court is not alone in finding its own voice in the expression of reason 
in an all-things-considered judgment. Proportionality review is central, 
for example, to the Canadian Supreme Court's jurisprudence.55 
Proportionality review is often criticized as a practical judgment 
that lacks the indicia of legal principle and instead involves the courts 
in making policy.56 This criticism, however, fails to understand the 
genealogy of proportionality review, which lies in the belief that the 
rule of law is the internalization of reason itself as a regulative ideal 
within the political order. Proportionality is the form that reason will 
take when there is no longer a faith in formalism - i.e., when reason 
must be sensitive to circumstance - and there is no longer a belief in 
a single coherent order among what are otherwise conflicting interests. 
The retreat of formalism is true across the entire sweep of the social 
sciences, which increasingly call for the parsing of particular interests 
within particular circumstances. The model of judicial reasoning is the 
situated judgment of "equity" - a form of reason already identified 
by Aristotle.57 This does not mean there is no room for principled 
judgments - indeed the derivation of rights continues to appeal to 
principle - but those principles do not apply independently of a 
contextualized judgment that takes into account competing interests. 
As long as belief in a formal science of law is strong, the reasoned 
judgments of a court look different from the "all things considered" 
judgments of the political branches. When reasonableness replaces 
science, however, the work of a court looks like little more than 
54. See Aharon Barak, Foreword: A Judge on Judging: The Role of a Supreme Court in a 
Democracy, 1 16 HARV. L. REV. 16 (2002). 
55. See, e.g., R. v. Edwards Books & Art Ltd., [1986] 2 S.C.R. 713, 768; R. v. Oakes, 
[1986] 1 S.C.R. 103, 135-40. R. v. Edwards Books & Art Ltd., [1986] 2 S.C.R. 713, 768. 
56. See, e.g. , Richard Fallon, Foreword: Implementing the Constitution, 1 1 1  HARV. L. 
REV. 54, 79-80 (1997); Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1 175, 1 179-81 (1989). 
57. ARISTOTLE, THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS BK. V, ch. 10 (1137bl9-24). 
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prudence. Prudence may be a political virtue, but why should it be the 
constitutional norm to which all other political virtues are held 
accountable? In the end, a judicial claim to prudence is likely to be 
judged on political grounds: Is the polity better off, all things 
considered, with judges exercising a second-order judgment of 
reasonableness? That question will be answered in part by a judgment 
on the policies produced - the form of analysis offered by the social 
scientist. But, in part, it will also be answered by the continuing appeal 
of the Western ideal of law as the internalization of reason, even as 
the form of reason changes. 
If we move from national to transnational courts, the appeal of 
reason appears even stronger precisely because there is no counterpart 
to the sovereign will. There is, of course, the formalism of a treaty's 
text, which can be -read as an expression of national will in form of 
consent. But contemporary international courts are not arbitration 
bodies; their founding texts speak to ideals and principles that require 
interpretations, not merely the formal application of that text. The 
expansion of the European Court of Justice into the domain of 
human rights was a powerful example of the independence of reason 
from text.58 That court, too, increasingly understands reason as 
reasonableness. This is entirely in accord with the ideal of the devel­
opment of Europe, which is not a mobilization of a transnational 
European will, but the development of a reasonable course of action. 
The norms of Europe are bureaucratic, not democratic. The measure 
of reason within administration is just this ideal of reasonableness all 
things considered. Accordingly, the power of the European Court is 
inextricably linked to its capacity to express itself as the voice of 
reasonableness guarding against the pathologies of administration, on 
the one hand, and national self-interest, on the other. 
Reasonableness and proportionality may dominate the judicial 
voice in much of Europe, but it would be a mistake to see there the 
single model for the future of judicial review. Proportionality review is 
hardly absent from American jurisprudence, but here it is always 
viewed with some skepticism as too close to political judgment.59 The 
deeper point is that the source of the American Court's power lies in 
the direction of will, not reason. This . Court is primarily concerned 
with legitimacy, not justice. 
In a state in which citizenship is understood as a matter of civic, 
rather than ethnic, identity, the constitution may be the most impor­
tant point of reification of the group. The constitution is understood to 
be the self-expression of the sovereign people. It is a product of their 
58. See J.H.H. Weiler, The Transformation of Europe, 100 YALE L.J. 2403, 2417 (1991). 
59. See, e.g. , T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 
YALE L.J. 943 (1987); Paul W. Kahn, The Court, the Community and the Judicial Balance: 
The Jurisprudence of Justice Powell, 97 YALE L.J. 1 (1987). 
2700 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 101 :2677 
will and thus an objectification of the founding idea of the nation as a . 
selfconstituting community. This is the case in the United States, in 
which every assertion of political loyalty - oaths of office and of 
naturalization, for example - is made to the Constitution.60 The 
Constitution is the sovereign will as an enduring object in the world. 
Political will is power, and power unexpressed is not power at all. In 
this sense, the Constitution is the political analogue of the Bible. The 
Bible is not just an expression of the divine will. It is the point at which 
that divine will manifests itself and is thus constituted as power. 
Still, to observe this function of a constitution is not yet to specify 
any particular institution's relationship to the constitution. The French ' 
view their Revolution in much the same terms as the Americans: the 
mobilization of the popular sovereign as an act of will. They, too, iden­
tify with a revolutionary tradition of civic nationalism. But the French 
courts did not emerge from the Revolution with the power to speak in 
the name of the popular sovereign. The locus of that voice was instead 
the French Assembly.61 Comparing the French and American judicial 
experiences raises the question of the conditions under which a court 
can speak in the name of the will of the sovereign people. There is no 
abstract answer to this question. We know that it is a possibility 
because the American Court has indeed accomplished this. 
The most critical point of Marbury is the Court's claim to speak in · 
the name of the popular sovereign. By the end of the opinion, we are 
to believe that the opinion of the Court is the opinion of the people. It 
is not quite correct to say that the authority of the Court derives from 
the people. Rather, the opinion of the Court quite literally is the 
authority of the people. Marbury begins as a kind of continuation of 
the election of 1800 - a contest of representation between Federalists 
and Republicans. The Court wins that contest - at least in the 
long run - by making a claim that is beyond representation. The 
voice of the Court is the sacred voice of the people themselves.62 
Of course, the Court has no interest in suggesting that the sover­
eign people speak in an irrational manner. It does not disregard the 
internalization of the norm of reason in a legal order. Yet, will pre- · 
cedes reason - legitimacy precedes justice - in American constitu­
tionalism. The sovereign people first create themselves by speaking 
themselves into existence. This is an act of will. God spoke and there 
was something rather than nothing; the people spoke and there was 
something new in the world. The techniques of the judicial decision do 
60. This tradition of patriotism directed at the Constitution is what made the new dis­
course of "homeland" security so jarring to many. 
61. On the development of constitutional review in France post-World War II, see 
STONE, supra note 27. 
62. For an exploration of the rhetorical and conceptual techniques by which the Court 
achieves this, see KAHN, REIGN OF LAW, supra note 1, at 102-74. 
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not derive primarily from the necessities of reason, but from those of 
will. All of our constitutional pronouncements begin from the text and 
then move to history. Even those scholars and lawyers who would 
move on must begin with text and history. This is not because these 
sources give us clear answers or eliminate interpretative debate but 
because it is through the text that identity is maintained between the 
judicial voice and the voice of the popular sovereign. The Court is 
quite literally all of us: it maintains that faith in the mystical corpus of 
the state, which is nothing other than the popular sovereign. 
The fundamental problem of democratic constitutionalism is to 
negotiate the relationship between reason and will. This is not a 
matter of identifying particular institutional spaces or discrete princi­
ples. It may appear that way from within a cultural practice that will 
include contending voices and institutions making arguments of both 
sorts. From the perspective of the study of culture, however, reason 
and will are neither institutional regimes nor objective principles. 
Much that has been thought to be reasonable turns out to be quite 
unreasonable - from alchemy to divine right, to Newtonian science in 
a world of quarks. Reason operates in law not in the form of Hegel's 
cunning of reason, but only as a set of ideas which courts and others 
believe to be appropriate at particular points in time. Similarly, there 
is no noncontextualized measure of the truth of a claim to express the 
will of the popular sovereign. The difference between a coup and a 
revolution lies in the perceived absence or presence of the popular 
sovereign; this is a matter of belief, not metaphysics. The popular 
sovereign is present when there is a belief in its presence. Every failed 
revolution is understood, in retrospect, to lack the support of the 
popular sovereign. But even failed efforts can be recovered when 
history is rewritten by a later, successful revolutionary effort.63 The 
negotiation of the relationship between reason and will is more like a 
negotiation of the space between two gods - the Father and the Son 
- than it is like a negotiation of a contract among parties with con­
flicting interests. It is a hermeneutic task bound by the possibilities 
that already exist within a culture. 
We have then two different sets of distinctions that can serve to 
plot the character of constitutional discourse or, more directly, the 
voice of a court engaged in judicial review. First, there is the distinc­
tion between reason and will or between justice and legitimacy. Each 
of these forms of discourse tends toward a totalizing perspective. 
Thus, the discourse of justice easily ignores the importance of national 
borders. It moves naturally toward universal norms; it aspires for insti­
tutions of international governance. A judicial voice that rests funda­
mentally on a discourse of reason will find itself easily moving from 
63. Consider the 1848 revolts in Europe or the converse phenomenon in understanding 
the Confederacy or the Bolsheviks. 
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the particular, to the comparative, to the universal. This is the pattern 
of thought behind the emergence of a strong European Court of 
Justice in a hierarchical relationship to the national constitutional 
courts.64 Conversely, the discourse of legitimacy can easily marginalize 
claims of universality. American constitutional jurisprudence gives us 
many examples of this phenomenon, including the early statement by 
Justice Iredell disclaiming any judicial use of abstract theories of 
justice: 
The ideas of natural j ustice are regulated by no fixed standard: the ablest 
and purest men have differed upon the subject; and all that the Court 
could properly say . . .  would be, that the Legislature . . .  had passed an 
act which, in the opinion of the j udges, was inconsistent with the abstract 
principles of natural j ustice.65 
American judicial resistance to arguments from international and 
comparative law has its source in an idea of an American exceptional­
ism that rests not on American power, but rather on a vibrant idea of 
popular sovereignty as the source of the rule of law.66 Those who ob- . 
ject to American legal exceptionalism too often appeal to a discourse 
of reason that simply fails to make contact with the ground norm of 
the American rule of law. 
Second, within each of these categories a further distinction is to 
be made. Within the discourse of reason, we can distinguish between 
those constitutional courts that pursue an autonomous "legal science" 
and those that understand their role as mediating between law and the 
expression of reason more generally. In American jurisprudential 
thought this distinction is marked by Langdell at one end and 
Dworkin - or the followers of law and economics - at the other. The 
constitutional, common-law reasoning of the Supreme Court in a deci­
sion like Lochne-1'7 stands in marked contrast to the eclectic, social­
science reasoning of Brown.68 In European courts, there is a similar 
conflict as those courts move from the traditional, formalism charac­
teristic of continental legal science to a model of reasonableness as 
proportionality review.69 Within the discourse of legitimacy we can 
distinguish between norms of ethnic and of civic nationalism. The 
exploration of the role of ethnic nationalism in nineteenth and early 
twentieth-century American constitutional thought is a burgeoning 
64. See the German Solange cases as expressions of resistance and collapse: Decision of · 
October 22, 1986, BVerfGE 73, 339; Decision of May 29, 1974, BVerfGE 37, 271 . 
65. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 385, 398-99 (1798) (Iredell, J.). 
66. See, e.g. , Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 921 n.11 (1997). 
67. Lochner v. New York, 1 98 U.S. 45 (1905). 
68. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
69. On the growth of balancing o� proportionality review, see STONE SWEET, supra note 
1 2 ,  at 97-99, 1 14-24. 
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field of legal studies.70 The experience of European courts with ethnic 
nationalism remains a reminder that we cannot expect courts to save 
us from ourselves.71 
While every modern constitution must negotiate this relationship 
between reason and will, not every judiciary will do it in the same way. 
If we imagine a single axis with reason at one end and will at the other, 
we can distinguish among constitutional cultures by observing the 
direction in which they are inclined to move. One critical point at 
which we can make this observation is when a constitutional court 
speaks: Does it speak in the voice of the popular sovereign or in the 
voice of reason? The single axis suggests that the voice is not neces­
sarily one or the other. There is no requirement that a court pick one 
option over the other: it may appeal to different voices in different 
circumstances. 
How and where a constitutional court locates itself within these 
possibilities is as much a matter of judicial experience as it is of 
abstract beliefs about a constitutional order. Judicial experience is not 
independent of the larger context of political experience - particu­
larly the experience of victory and defeat. Constitutional norms can 
have their source from outside of the polity: they can be imposed as a 
consequence of political defeat or foreign intervention. Under those 
circumstances, it is unlikely that the rule of law will mobilize a cultural 
ideal of the sovereign will. The emergence of a constitutionalism of 
reason in Europe surely reflects a twentieth-century experience of 
disaster with the politics of the sovereign will. American popular 
sovereignty, on the other hand, appeals to a 200 year narrative of 
triumph. 
There is rarely a single story to be told with respect to the 
relationship of reason and will within constitutional jurisprudence: 
both sources are too deeply embedded in Western belief. The 
American Court, for example, pursued an ideal of legal science at the 
end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century.72 
This was a time of self-confident belief in national progress, but also a 
time still within the historical memory of the "failure" of the original 
constitutional design in the Civil War. The science of constitutional 
law had a distinctly Social Darwinist cast, but this is misunderstood if 
seen as merely an expression of the personal beliefs of the Justices. 
Even an autonomous science of law cannot turn to an ideal of reason 
that fails to cohere with "the best" available theories of political 
70. See, e.g. , IAN F. HANEY LOPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF 
RACE (1996); EFREN RIVERA RAMOS, THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF IDENTITY: THE 
JUDICIAL AND SOCIAL LEGACY OF AMERICAN COLONIALISM IN PUERTO RICO (2001). 
71. See, e.g. , INGO MULLER, HITLER'S JUSTICE: THE COURTS OF THE THIRD REICH 
(Deborah Lucas Schneider trans., 1991). 
72. See KAHN, LEGITIMACY AND HISTORY, supra note 40, at 108-17. 
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justice, any more than legal science can insist that the world is flat 
once the best available view is that it is round. That Court could no 
more avoid Social Darwinism than a present Court can avoid ideals of 
justice that have a certain similarity to the theories of John Rawls or 
Jurgen Habermas. It is not a coincidence that rights of speech and 
communication dominate so much of contemporary constitutional 
jurisprudence. In the American experience, however, this appeal to a 
science of constitutional law is thoroughly discredited in the political 
confrontation between the Court and the New Deal. The triumph of 
Roosevelt leaves an enduring characterization of the science of law as 
transcendental nonsense.73 
If we tum from twentieth-century America to post-War Europe, 
we see a very different experience of constitutionalism, beginning with ' 
the repudiation of a politics of the sovereign will. Constitutional 
review starts from a Kelsenian model. Kelsen is more social scientist 
than legal scholar for he locates reason outside of the law.74 He objects 
to the constitutionalization of rights since this will invite courts to 
deploy norms of reason within the law. Instead, he offers a principle­
agent theory of constitutional authority founded on a belief in legal 
positivism - a jurisprudence of will stripped of its contact with the 
vibrant politics of popular sovereignty. Yet, the story of European 
constitutional courts is one of expansion along the dimension of rea­
son. European constitutional courts incorporate doctrines of rights -
the first demand of the jurisprudence of reason. They proceed to take 
on a positive, and not merely a negative role, deploying the situated 
judgment of reason as proportionality. They are leading agents in the 
development of a transnational order of law as reasonableness. And 
that discourse has been very much a part of the project of establishing 
a liberal identity for the European citizen. 
III. CONCLUSION 
I can summarize much of what I have argued by reversing direction 
and asking what it is that constitutionalism is not. It is not a political 
structure that advances the interests of a faction at the expense of 
others. When inherited constitutional structures have this appearance, 
the conceptual conditions of revolution are present - of course, the 
material conditions of successful revolution may not be present. Every 
revolution speaks of the abuse of power in the pursuit of individual or 
73. Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. 
L. REV. 809 (1 935). 
74. This follows from Kelsen's positivism and his opposition to placing a bill of rights -
"norms of natural law" - in a constitution. See Hans Kelsen, Le garantie juridictionnel de la 
constitution, 44 Revue de droit public 197 (1928), discussed in ALEC STONE SWEET, THE 
BIRTH OF JUDICIAL POLITICS IN FRANCE 228-31 (1992). 
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factional - including class - interests. Since every polity is marked 
by inequality, the burden on the privileged is always to convince the 
general population that inequality in fact serves their interests. The 
British aristocracy was remarkably successful at this, negotiating their 
own relinquishment of power over more than a century.75 The French 
aristocracy was not: falling in a moment of revolutionary enthusiasm.76 
The discourse of "special interests" marks the same phenomenon in 
American politics. 
The enemy of constitutionalism is found in this convergence of 
political epithets: interest, faction, class. All gain their meaning from 
the opposition to the public good, which is delineated by reason and 
affirmed by the will of the sovereign. But just here agreement begins 
to break down. There are two paths open to a constitutional court 
even as it affirms a common set of aspirations - that of justice and 
that of legitimacy. 
Modern, western constitutionalism rests on patterns of thought 
that are as old as the West itself. We simultaneously believe in 
the universality of norms and in the nation; we believe . in rationality 
and autonomy, in justice and legitimacy. At the source of all of these 
antinomies is the tension between reason and will. Western constitu­
tionalism does not resolve this antinomy but situates itself, in all of its 
various forms, within it. It cannot resolve the conflict because there is 
no single right way to pursue law's rule. Indeed, while the American 
Court has had spectacular success along the path of will, it is the 
exceptional voice in contemporary constitutionalism. Most constitu­
tional courts today speak a language of reason, of universal values, of 
situated judgments of reasonableness. Of course, across a wide variety 
of issues there will be agreement, whichever path a court pursues. But 
there remains a deep division over the conception of self and polity 
that animates the legal culture. Marbury is one model, but not the only 
one. Its voice has become our voice. That voice is distinctly not the 
voice of reason; it is the voice of our popular sovereign. Other nations 
have good grounds to pursue a constitutional voice of reason over that 
of a popular sovereign. It would be remarkably shortsighted for 
American legal scholars to urge Marbury upon them. 
75. See, e.g., DAVID CANNADINE, ORNAMENTALISM: How THE BRITISH SAW THEIR 
EMPIRE (2001). 
76. On the night of August 4, 1 789, the French National Assembly abolished feudalism 
and all privileges possessed by the aristocracy. 
